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GORSUCH V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Heather Elliott
Perhaps nowhere does Justice Gorsuch depart as farfrvm Justice Scalia as in the context of administra-
tive law.
Justice Scalia generally supported the administrative state. While no fan of regulation, he deferred to
ageny decision-making, believing that Chevron implemented the Founders' intention that the Execu-
tive, not the courts, reasonably resolve statutogy amb'guities. He wrote Auer, which commands defer-
ence to agengy interpretations of their own regulations (though late in his career he would argue for
abandoning Auer). He wrote City of Arlington, which requires courts to defer under Chevron even
when an agency interprets the boundaries of its own jurisdiction-a context in which we might expect
courts to rein in ageny overreaching. And he wrote Whitman v. American Trucking, which in-
terred a late-twentieth century effort to revive the Lochner era's nondelegation doctine.
Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, presents himsef as afoe of the administrative state. While on the Tenth
Circuit, he argued against Chevron and intimated that he would overrule it if he could. He endorsed
strengthening the nondelegation doctrine and has even questioned the consituionaflty of agencies alto-
gether. Gorsuch undoubtedly agrees with Scaka's late r/ection of Auer. And Gorsuch rejects Brand
X, which requires dSeerence to an ageny's interpretation of an ambiguous tatute even when a court has
already adopted a c~fferent interpretation. Here Gorsuch and Scaia agree, both finding it unconstitu-
tional for a judicial decision to be 'ubject to revision by a potifcaly accountable branch of govern-
ment. "
What consequences will Justice Gorsuchs views have? Justices Thomas and Aito undoubtedly share
his suspicions of the administrative state, and Justice Kavanaugh reportedy does as well. That's four
votes for major change in administrative law doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
At his confirmation hearing to fill Justice Antonin Scalia's seat on the Su-
preme Court of the United States, then-Judge Neil Gorsuch described Scalia
as a "legal herofl" and a "mentor."' He also said that he and Justice Scalia "did
not agree on everything": he specifically mentioned fly-fishing technique.2 But
* Alumni, Class of '36 Professor of Law, Hugh F. Culverhouse Jr. School of Law at the University
of Alabama. A small portion of the analysis in this Essay also appears in Heather Elliott, Justice Gorsuch's
Would-Be War on Chevron, 21 GREEN BAG 2D 315 (2018). I thank the Alabama Law Review for the oppor-
tunity to participate in this Symposium, Kristin Hickman and Hillel Levin for helpful comments on the talk
on which this Essay is based, and Stuart Rachels for eagle-eyed review of an earlier draft. Jason Conneil
provided helpful research assistance.
1. Confirmation Heating on the Nomination of Hon. Nei/M. Gorsuch to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciay, 115th Cong. 65 (2017) (statement of Judge Neil
M. Gorsuch).
2. Id.
Gorsuch v. The Administrative State
Justice Scalia and now-Justice Gorsuch disagree about more: they disagree
profoundly about the administrative state.
Justice Scalia spent much of his pre-judicial career in the Executive
Branch3 and served as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit,4 the dominant court in administrative law.5
When testifying at his Senate confirmation hearing for the Supreme Court,
Scalia emphasized that courts should defer to administrative agencies, which
are the agents of Congress.6 In doing so, Scalia was not just telling Congress
what it (then) wanted to hear: as a Justice, Scalia was committed to this idea of
deference.
Scalia endorsed the Chevron doctrine,7 which requires courts to defer to an
administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute;
Scalia believed that such deference (while possibly inconsistent with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act) implements the Founders' intention that the Ex-
ecutive, not the courts, reasonably resolve statutory ambiguities.8 He wrote for
the Court in Auer, which commanded strong deference to agency interpreta-
tions of their own regulations,9 though he later changed his mind.10 Scalia
wrote for the Court in Ciy ofArington, holding that Chevron deference is owed
even to agency determinations of the scope of their own authorityll---despite
cogent reasons to refuse deference in these situations.12 And he wrote the
3. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
4. JOAN BiSKuPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 80 (2009).
5. John G. Roberts, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REv. 375, 388-
89 (2006) ('The first decision to give administrative jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit in 1870, [and other]
decisions in the early twentieth century, became prototypes for a succession of legislative grants of authority
to review decisions of the FCC, the Federal Power Agency (later FERC), the EPA, the NLRB, the FTC,
and the FAA. Whatever combination of letters you can put together, it is likely that jurisdiction to review
that agency's decision is vested in the D.C. Circuit." (footnote omitted)).
6. Nomination ofJudge Antonin Scaha, to Be Associate Jusice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciagy, 99th Cong. 36 (1986) (statement of Judge Antonin Scalia).
7. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also infra notes 110-
15 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-43 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Chevron is
"in accord with the origins of federal-court judicial review.... Statutory ambiguities ... were left to reason-
able resolution by the Executive"); see also infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (noting tension be-
tween Chevron and the Administrative Procedure Act).
9. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1997); see also infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
11. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296-97 (2013); see also infra notes 147-60 and accompa-
nying text.
12. Id. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). As Chief Justice Roberts argued, Chevron deference is owed
only when a court determines that Congress empowered the agency to regulate in the given area; if there is
ambiguity about the agency's scope of authority, then a court should determine that question de novo: only
after that question is answered can it be determined whether the agency receives any deference. Id. Moreo-
ver, he argued, it is precisely when the boundaries of agency authority are at stake that we might worry
about agency power-grabs. Id; see also infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
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unanimous opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking13 which rejected a 1999
effort by the D.C. Circuit to revive the nondelegation doctrine.
14
To be sure, Justice Scalia was no progressive: he advocated deregulation
in his pre-judicial career;'5 his strict textualism led him often to conclude that
statutory language was clear and thus left no room for administrative policy-
making through interpretation;16 and his narrow view of Article III standing
to sue undermined Congress's efforts to permit citizen enforcement of admin-
istrative regulations.17 But he fundamentally believed that "we have proba-
bly..., the most open and efficient system of administrative law in the
world."18
Justice Gorsuch takes a very different view of the administrative state-as
many have noted approvingly.19 While on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch wrote a
lengthy concurrence arguing that Chevron should be abolished because judges,
not agencies, should authoritatively interpret law.
20 He recognized that, as an
intermediate appellate court judge, he was bound by Chevron,
21 but of course
now-Justice Gorsuch is bound only by stare decisis. And, indeed, he has al-
ready taken steps that confirm his antipathy to the deference doctrines ,22
though not every step he could have taken.
23 (Kisor v. Wilkie, a case just grant-
ed that asks whether Auer should be overturned,
24 should provide more evi-
dence regarding Justice Gorsuch's views.)
If Justice Gorsuch's apparent desire to overturn Chevron is disturbing, then
even more disturbing are his hints that he fundamentally opposes the adminis-
13. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
14. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cit. 1999), and opinion on denial of
rehg en bane, 195 F.3d 4 (1999), afd inpad & rv'd inpart, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
15. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text
16. E.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1994).
17. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992).
18. Administrative Conference of the United State: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerial &Admn. Law
of tbe H. Comm. on the Judiriay, 111th Cong. 32-33 (2010).
19. E.g., 163 CONG. REC. S562-63 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017); see infra notes 122-90 and accompanying
text.
20. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
("For whatever the ageney may be doing under Chevron, the problem remains that courts are not fulfilling
their duty to interpret the law and declare invalid agency actions inconsistent with those interpretations in
the cases and controversies that come before them.").
21. De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2016) (describing Chevron as arguably
unconstitutional but then stating "[s]till, as... a court of appeals[,] Chevron... bind[s] us").
22. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
23. Justice Gorsuch did not join Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105,
2120 (2018), in which Justice Kennedy was critical of Chevron even though, as the case was decided by the
majority, Chevron did not apply. Gorsuch's decision not to join Kennedy is interesting, given that Gorsuch
agrees with Justice Kennedy's criticisms, see infra notes 67-69, 195-98 and accompanying text, and given
that Gorsuch has not refrained from criticizing Chevron in other contexts where the Chevron question was
not squarely raised, see Heather Elliott, Jnstice Gorsuch's Would-Be War on Chevron, 21 GREEN BAG 2D 315
(2018).
24. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari as to question one).
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trative state. The Court currently requires deference to Congress, even when
Congress delegates extremely broad policymaking discretion to agencies.25
Then-Judge Gorsuch suggested that such delegation is unconstitutional.26 He
has also raised questions about administrative agencies exercising judicial
powers.27 And Judge Gorsuch even gestured toward a belief that administra-
tive agencies are themselves unconstitutional.28
The disagreement between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Scalia is not total:
they agree about Brand X.29 That case requires deference to agency interpreta-
tions of an ambiguous statute even when a court has already adopted a differ-
ent interpretation. Both Scalia and Gorsuch believe it unconstitutional to
permit a judicial decision to be "subject to revision by a politically accountable
branch of government.' '3
0
How revolutionary will Justice Gorsuch's appointment be for the defer-
ence doctrines and for the administrative state? As Professor Hickman argues
in this Issue,31 the docket of the Supreme Court is considerably different from
that of the Tenth Circuit, which may lead Justice Gorsuch to temper some of
his more virulent criticisms of Chevron and the administrative state. But Justice
Gorsuch will undoubtedly treat agencies more harshly than did Justice Scalia.
And that appears to be one of the reasons President Trump nominated him32
25. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
26. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 ("Some thoughtful judges and scholars have
questioned whether standards like [the intelligible principle doctrine] serve as much as a protection against
the [improper] delegation of legislative authority as a license for it, undermining the separation between the
legislative and executive powers that the founders thought essential."); see infra notes 122-34 and accompa-
nying text.
27. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380-86 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board is an unconstitutional delegation
of Article III power to a federal agency).
28. GutierreZ-Bi.Zuela, 834 F.3d at 1155 ("Even under the most relaxed or functionalist view of our
separated powers some concern has to arise, too, when so much power is concentrated in the hands of a
single branch of government. See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) ('The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.').
29. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
30. GufirreZ-Briz-ela, 834 F.3d at 1150; see BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Article
I courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or ignored by executive officers.'; GuemrZ-
Bti!puela, 834 F.3d at 1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("mT1he framers sought to ensure that judicial judgments
may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by the elected branches of govern-
ment.... Yet... [b]y Brand's own telling, this means a judicial declaration of the law's meaning in a case
or controversy before it is not authoritative but is instead subject to revision by a politically accountable
branch of government." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
31. See Kristin Hickman, To Repudiate or Mere# Curtail? Juaice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA.
L REv. 733 (2019).
32. Kevin Daley (@KevinDaleyDC), TWTTER (Feb. 22, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://twitter.com/
KevinDaleyDC/status/966738196070584325 (reporting that White House Counsel Don McGahn, speak-
ing at CPAC 2018, "says Gorsuch's forceful writings on administrative law issues was [sic] a decisive factor
in selecting him for #SCOTUS, citing Gorsuch's anti-Chevron concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizeela [sic].
#AppellateTwitter").
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and why at least some Senators voted to confirm his appointment.
33 Moreo-
ver, several other Justices on the Court seem ready to make at least some
changes to the deference doctrines.
34
In Part I of this Essay, I address the biographical and generational differ-
ences between Justices Scalia and Gorsuch, which strikingly correlate to their
views of the administrative state. I then turn to doctrine, discussing Chevron,
Auer, City of Arlington, Whitman, and Brand X, assessing the views of Justices
Scalia and Gorsuch on each in turn. I conclude with some thoughts about the
fate of the deference doctrines, and about the administrative state more gen-
erally, given the new membership of the Court.
I. DIFFERENT MEN
Justice Scalia and Justice Gorsuch have strikingly different professional
biographies. Those differences arguably lead to at least some of their differ-
ences on administrative law doctrine. The two were also born into different
generations, and their generational preoccupations were different: Justice Scal-
ia worried about the "overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance,"35 and Justice Gorsuch worried about the "titanic administrative
state."
36
A. Different Formative Experiences
1. Justice Scalia, the Administrative Lawyer
Justice Scalia's extensive experience within the administrative state argua-
bly framed his later judicial approach to administrative law. After several years
in private practice and a four-year stint teaching law at the University of Vir-
ginia,37 he joined the Nixon Administration as general counsel of the Office of
Telecommunications Policy.38 Nixon then appointed him to head the Admin-
33. 163 CONG. REC. S563 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Senator Mike Lee from Utah),
("[Judge Gorsuch] is a critic of an obscure but very significant legal rule known as the Chevron doc-
trine.... The problem with Chevron, as Judge Gorsuch has pointed out, is that it tends to divest the courts
of their obligation to 'say what the law is[.]'.. . It has led to a system in which executive agencies not only
make and enforce the law but also interpret the law, arrogating to themselves, in effect, some aspects of the
powers allocated to all three branches of the Federal Government."). Senator Lee appears to have over-
looked that agencies may only exercise, and courts will only allow them to exercise, powers that the Con-
gress in which he serves has given them.
34. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing votes of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito, and potential votes of Justice Kavanaugh).
35. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983).
36. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
37. BISKUPIC, supra note 4, at 37-38.
38. Id. at 38.
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istrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), a federal agency whose
mission is to improve how agencies function.39 Justice Scalia would later say
that ACUS had a "significant (and... laudable) impact" in helping federal
agencies to function better.4°
After two years heading up ACUS, Scalia was appointed to lead the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice, nominated by Pres-
ident Nixon but confirmed under President Ford.41 OLC advises the Execu-
tive Branch on questions of law and is frequently asked to provide opinions
on administrative law matters.42 When Scalia was head of OLC from August
1974 to December 1976, OLC issued opinions on several administrative law
issues including the constitutionality of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act,43 the constitutionality of regulatory reform legislation for independent
agencies,44 and a question under the Freedom of Information Act regarding
access to the FBI's COINTELPRO files.
45
Obviously, Scalia's work in the Executive Branch was under Republican
Administrations, and Scalia was a proponent of deregulation. After Jimmy
Carter became president in 1977, Scalia left government service, first for the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he edited Regulation magazine.46
He continued to edit Regulation even after leaving AEI to become a law pro-
fessor at the University of Chicago.47
In 1982, President Reagan nominated Scalia to the D.C. Circuit. Scalia
had turned down Reagan's suggestion of a seat on the Seventh Circuit: "[H]e
preferred [the D.C. Circuit], which specialized in regulatory matters and would
mean a return to the Washington area."48 Viewed by many as the second-most
39. Id. at 34.
40. Antonin Scalia & Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Administrative Conference, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1205, 1210 (2015).
41. BISKUPIC, supra note 4, at 40.
42. See, e.g., Designating an Acting Att'y Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.jus
tice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download; Auth. to Permit Part-Time Emps. to Work Regularly Scheduled
Workweeks of 33 to 39 Hours, 39 Op. O.L.C. 1 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opinion/file
/880836/download.
43. Constitutionality of the Fed. Advisory Comm. Act, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 502 (1974),
https://www.justice.gov/file/20921 /download.
44. Constitutionality of Regulatory Reform Legislation for Indep. Agencies, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 397
(1976), https://www.justice.gov/file/20881/download.
45. FOIA Appeal from Denial of Access to FBI COINTELPRO Files Regarding Professor Morris
Starsky, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 373 (1974), https://www.justice.gov/file/20861/download. COINTELPRO
was J. Edgar Hoover's notorious FBI program of surveilling and infiltrating American political organiza-
tions and actors, including the Communist Party of the USA; anti-Vietnam War organizations; the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference; Martin Luther King, Jr.; Students for a Democratic Society; the American
Indian Movement; and supporters of Irish Republicanism. See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 9-29 (1976).
46. BISKUPIC, supra note 4, at 65-67.
47. Id.
48. Id at 80.
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important federal court after the Supreme Court,4 9 the D.C. Circuit is the
dominant court in administrative law. 50 Scalia served on the D.C. Circuit for
four years.
Reagan then nominated Scalia as Associate Justice on the Supreme
Court.5' At his Senate confirmation hearing, Scalia repeatedly emphasized his
view that courts should defer to Congress and, accordingly, to the agencies
that Congress establishes.5 2 Indeed, he stated, a regulation "can be reasonably
wrong headed, and we will approve it. 's 3 He also emphasized his fidelity to
legislation and precedent over his own political preferences:
[A]s I mentioned earlier, I was editor of Regulation magazine. And one of
my policy preferences in those days was deregulation. But an examination
of my opinions will show that I have fully enforced actions by agencies
that go in precisely the opposite direction; and indeed, I have stopped
agencies from going in a deregulatory direction when it seemed to me...
the statute simply did not let them do it.
The Constitution gives those [policy] calls to [Congress] who, by defini-
tion, know better, because they are democratically elected.
4
Scalia was also asked specifically about his views on Congress's delegation
of policymaking authority to agencies. In his testimony, he urged Congress to
be more specific in its delegations but asserted that it was almost impossible
for courts to find delegation unconstitutionally broad: "[IMt is very difficult for
the courts to say how much delegation is too much. It is a very, very difficult
question, and I think... the courts are just going to have to leave that consti-
tutional issue to be resolved by the Congress.55 None of this was simply spin
to obtain Senators' votes. As I will discuss in Part II, Justice Scalia followed
through on his commitments to deference and delegation.
49. Julia Turner, What's So Important About the Washington, D.C, Circuit Court ofAppeals?, SLATE (Feb.
7, 2003, 5:46 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-poitics/2003/02/the-second-highest-court-in-the-land.
html.
50. Roberts, supra note 5, at 388-89 ("The first decision to give administrative jurisdiction to the
D.C. Circuit in 1870, [and other] decisions in the early twentieth century, became prototypes for a succes-
sion of legislative grants of authority to review decisions of the FCC, the Federal Power Agency Qlater
FERC), the EPA, the NLRB, the FTC, and the FAA. Whatever combination of letters you can put togeth-
er, it is likely that jurisdiction to review that agency's decision is vested in the D.C. Circuit." (footnote omit-
ted)).
51. BisKupic, supra note 4, at 109.
52. Nomination of Judge Antonin Sca/ia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hear-
ings Before the S. Comm. on tbeJudiiag, 99th Cong. 35 (1986) (statement of Judge Antonin Scalia) ('The fine
call is for the agency. And the courts look it over to see that it has not been so unreasonable as to be arbi-
trary or capricious. As far as I know, it seems to have worked pretty well.").
53. Id. at 65.
54. Id. at 54-55.
55. Id. at 40.
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Gorsuch v. The Administraive State
2. Justice Gorsuch, the Liigator and Law Clerk
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Gorsuch has spent little time in the Execu-
tive Branch. He did serve one year in the George W. Bush Administration's
Justice Department, but primarily in a national security litigation role.56 Justice
Gorsuch's primary legal experience before becoming a judge was as a private
litigator with the elite Kellogg Huber firm, 5 7 where he spent ten years (eight as
a partner) focusing on trial practice.58 Now known as Kellogg Hansen, the
firm's primary practice areas include telecommunications, intellectual proper-
ty, white collar and government investigation defense, and commercial litiga-
tion.59
One of Gorsuch's exposures to the administrative state came from his
mother's time as head of the Reagan Administration's EPA. Ann Gorsuch
Burford was the first female head of the EPA60 and the 1980s version of Pres-
ident Trump's now-former EPA head Scott Pruitt.6 1 She cut the EPA's budg-
et by nearly a quarter, staffed her office with pro-business decisionmakers,
and was accused by "Republicans and Democrats alike... of dismantling her
agency rather than directing it to aggressively protect the environment.' 62 She
lasted fewer than two years, "forced to resign after she was cited for contempt
of Congress for refusing to turn over Superfund records" on the ground of
executive privilege.63 It is not hard to imagine these events haping the then-
teenage Neil Gorsuch's views of the Executive Branch.
Another notable difference between Scalia and Gorsuch is that Scalia
56. Charlie Savage, Neil Gorsuch He45ed Dofend Diputed Bush-Era Terror Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/poltics/neil-gorsuch-torture-guantanamo-bay.html.
57. Kellogg Huber is known for its high standards, high compensation, and high billable-hours
requirements. See David Lat, Associate Bonus Watch: A Tak of Two Ltgation Powerhouses, ABOVE THE LAW
(Jan. 13, 2015, 3:47 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/01/associate-bonus-watch-a-tale-of-two-litiga
tion-powerhouses/ ("If you have [stellar] credentials and are willing to work like a do very hard, Kellogg
Huber might be for you.").
58. Trump Nominates Judge Neil Gorsuch for Supreme Court Vacangy, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://tucson.com/news/trump-nominates-judge-neil-gorsuch-for-supreme-court-vacancy/artide-1078e1
dc-e8la-11e6-8034-ebc4a066f235.htmL
59. Practices, KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.LL.C., www.kellogghansen.com/
practices.html.
60. Kimberly Kindy et al., Simp/ Stated, Gorsuch is Steadfast and Suorising WASH. POST (Feb. 19,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/poitics/gorsuch-profile/.
61. Chris Mooney, Pruitt Is Bringing Back Memories of the EPA's Most Tumultuous Era. But There's a Key
Differnce Now, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/
wp/2018/04/04/scott-pruitt-is-bringing-back-memories-of-the-epas-most-controversial-leader-but-theres-
a-key-difference/?noredirect=on&-um_term=.9025763b76a2 ("The parallels between Pruitt and Gorsuch
have been noted from the beginning - and they're growing in ways Pruitt is unlikely to enjoy.").
62. Patricia Sullivan, Anne Gorsuch Buford, 62, Dies; Reagan EPA Director, WASH. POST (July 22, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2004/07/22/anne-gorsuch-burford-62-dies/78b89129-7
28a-404e-8550-7b5617d5f291/utm.term=.7eaf474a2a2f ("Ms. Burford cut her agency's budget by 22
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never served as a law clerk. Gorsuch, on the other hand, clerked for three em-
inent federal judges: David Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit64 and Byron White and
Anthony Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court.65 It is difficult to tease out the
influences, if at all, of Justices White and Kennedy--White was already retired
when Gorsuch worked for him, and so Gorsuch worked in both chambers
simultaneously.66 In the one decision written by Kennedy in the 1993 Term
involving deference to administrative agencies, Kennedy gives strong defer-
ence to a decision by the Secretary of Health and Human Services regarding
Medicare.67 There is little to see in the 1993 Term that echoes now-Justice
Gorsuch's preoccupations.68 Uustice Kennedy has, however, in at least one
recent case, expressed doubts about some of Chevron's progeny.69 Interestingly,
Justice Gorsuch did not join Justice Kennedy's opinion in that case.)
Judge Sentelle may well have had an influence. He is a formalist and an
originalist, dissenting from modern doctrine in a number of cases on the D.C.
Circuit.70 Judge Sentelle has participated in Federalist Society panels on the
need to amend the Constitution to limit the federal government's power.
71
Judge Sentelle has, however, regularly applied Chevron and the other deference
doctrines and has not, as far as I can discover, ever criticized those doc-
trines.
72
64. Jim Morrill, Supreme Court Pick Gives Shout-Out to a Former Charlotte Mentor, CHARLOTTrE
OBSERVER (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article1300438
09.html.
65. Adam Liptak & Nicholas Fandos, How Gorsuch the Clerk Met Kennedy the Justice: A Tale of Luck,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-anthony-ken
nedy-supreme-court.html.
66. Id.
67. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994). Interestingly, in that case Justice Thom-
as dissents, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, id at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting); the
grounds for dissent would, I expect, resonate with now-Justice Gorsuch.
68. Cf Liptak & Fandos, supra note 65 ("Judge Gorsuch's term at the court was not without notable
decisions; the court issued significant rulings on discrimination in jury selection, protests outside abortion
clinics, voting rights, religious schools and copyright infringement for song parodies. But none qualified as
a blockbuster.").
69. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This separate writ-
ing is to note my concern with the way in which the Court's opinion in Chevron has come to be understood
and applied." (citation omitted)).
70. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cit. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate a species that lives entirely within one state). He was
not, however, on the panel that briefly revived the nondelegation doctrine. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
U.S. E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027, 1037-38 (D.C. Cit. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
71. Judge David B. Sentelle, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Introductory Remarks, (Nov.
18, 2006), in 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 455, 455 (2008) (adapting remarks from the 2006 Federalist Society Na-
tional Lawyers Convention Panel, Showcase Panel II: Are Constitutional Changes Necessary to Limit
Government?).
72. He has been accused of "emasculat[ing]" Chevron in at least one opinion, but the complaint is
more about Sentelle as a textualist than any action Sentelle took against Chevron itself. See David A. Schle-
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B. Generational Differences
Antonin Scalia grew up in a country being reshaped by federal judges. He
was born in 1936,73 about a year before the Supreme Court issued its first
landmark ruling upholding FDR's New Deal legislation74 and ending the eco-
nomics rights focus of the Lochner Court.75 Throughout his childhood and
youth, the Supreme Court issued decision after decision that worked sweeping
changes in American life.76 By the time he joined the Nixon Administration in
1971, the Warren Court had transformed the constitutional landscape.77 The
federal judiciary would continue to issue such far-reaching decisions for sever-
al more years.78 As Professor Strauss wrote, "[i]n the first half of the twentieth
century, courts were.., perceived as hostile to efforts to bring about equality
and social justice; after the Warren Court, the courts came to be seen by many
as the natural place for people to turn to achieve these objectives."79 And,
presumably not coincidentally, by the time Scalia joined the D.C. Circuit, he
was warning of "an overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance,"
something that had occurred "during the past few decades."
80
As a Scalia biographer puts it, "Scalia had long believed that judges were
wrongly using their own personal values to decide legal issues.81 While a law
professor at the University of Chicago in 1978, Scalia argued for the role of
singer, Note, Chevron Unlatined: The Inapp&abih'y ofte Canon Noscitur a Sociis Under Prong One ofte Chev-
ron Framework, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 638, 689 (1996).
73. BISKUPIC, supra note 4, at 11.
74. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
75. E.g., Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U.
L. REv. 677, 684-85 (2005).
76. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (binding states to Supreme Court precedent);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (incorporating freedom of association against the states);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) (establishing right to travel); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954) (requiing racial integration of public schools).
77. See generaly THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) (discussing
transformations of doctrine during Warren Court in areas of equal protection, freedom of speech, freedom
of press, freedom of religion, and criminal justice).
78. Seegeneral) United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (requiring President Nixon to turn over
tapes made secretly in the Oval Office); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (deeming work to be
obscene only if it lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (establishing gender as a suspect class); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing
women's right to choose abortion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (abolishing the death penalty
when applied in an arbitrary and capricious way); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(allowing publication of Pentagon Papers).
79. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius ofthe Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 847
(2007) (footnote omitted).
80. Scalia, supra note 35, at 881.
81. BISKUPIC, supra note 4, at 66 (describing Scalia's participation in an AEI symposium, An Imperial
Judiday: Fact or Myth?, AM. ENTER. INST. (1978), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/AEI-
FormnAn-Impeial-Judiciary.pd).
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procedure in constraining judicial power.82 After he joined the Supreme
Court, much of his jurisprudence sought to establish barriers to the activism
of the Warren Court and its ilk. He established the strict tripartite standing
test, which limits federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction;83 he was instru-
mental in the Rehnquist Court's revival of state sovereign immunity;84 and he
worked to limit Congress's authority to send more cases to the courts.
85
Neil Gorsuch, by contrast, grew up in a United States where Congress
was remaking the legal landscape with dozens of new regulatory statutes. Gor-
such was born in 1967, shortly after Congress had enacted landmark civil
rights legislation (the Civil Rights Act of 196486 and the Voting Rights Act8D
and a vast array of other statutes.88 In the decade following Gorsuch's birth,
Congress enacted dozens of civil rights, environmental, workplace safety, and
consumer-protection statutes.89 Congress also significantly overhauled the
Clean Air Act 90 and the Clean Water Act,9' turning them into major legislation
82. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 S. CT.
REV. 345, 405 ("[Olne of the functions of procedure is to limit power-not just the power to be unfair, but
the power to act in a political mode, or the power to act at all.... Is not the procedural limitation [that
courts proceed in an on-the-record adjudicatory mode rather than a notice-and-comment regulatory mode]
principally a restriction upon the power of the courts, impairing (however crudely) their ability and thus
their inclination to make social policy?').
83. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Seegeneral Heather Elliott, The Functions
of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 14 (2004).
85. See Heather Elliott, Congress's InabiAi to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L Rev. 159, 169-70, 175-
76, 202 (2011).
86. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). Congress also acted to prevent age discrimination in
1967. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012)).
87. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
10301-10314).
88. See Robert Dallek, LBJ and the Great Society: Preludes to the Obama Presideny and Obamacare, 62
DRAKE L. REV. 919, 921 (2014) (asserting that Lyndon B. Johnson signed 208 reform measures into law
during his presidency, including "civil rights; voting rights; Medicare and Medicaid; federal aid to elemen-
tary, secondary, and higher education; the 1965 immigration statute ... [; a] host of environmental and
consumer protections[;] child safety, traffic safety[;] national public radio, public television, [and] the Free-
dom of Information Act'").
89. E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795; Toxic
Substances Control Act, Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
523, 88 Star. 1660 (1974); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829; Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884; Domestic Volunteer Service Act of
1973, Pub. L No. 93-113, 87 Stat. 394; Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207
(1972); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Star. 1027; Education Amend-
ments of 1972, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Sta. 373, 373-75 (1972); Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Star. 1590; Controlled Substances Act, tit. II, Pub. L. No.
91-513, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242-85; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
230, 84 Star. 175 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970). By the time Gorsuch was graduating from law school in 1991, Congress had also enacted the Super-
fund statute (formally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
90. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
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that touched every corner of the United States.
At the same time, the judiciary-far from being the activist Warren
Court-was being remade by judges like Antonin Scalia and William
Rehnquist.92 No wonder, then, that Neil Gorsuch has perceived the enemy as,
not the courts, but "an already titanic administrative state"93 influenced by
"perfumed lawyers and lobbyists."94
II. SCAIA V. GORSUCH ON THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
As Part I demonstrated, there are biographical and generational reasons to
think that Justice Gorsuch will approach administrative law much differently
than Justice Scalia did. Those differences are confirmed by then-Judge Gor-
such's writings on the Tenth Circuit, in which he made clear his opposition to
Chevron. Though Gorsuch did not specifically address the other primary defer-
ence cases, such as Auer and City ofArlington, his views on Chevron suggest that
he would vote to overrule those cases as well. What's more, his views appear
to extend to broader criticisms of the administrative state: he has cited ap-
provingly Lochner-era cases on the nondelegation doctrine, while Justice Scalia
wrote for a unanimous court in Whitman, rejecting that doctrine. Only on
Brand X do Justices Scalia and Gorsuch agree. I discuss Chevron, Auer, City of
Arlington, Whitman, and Brand X in turn.
A. Chevron
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council involved the calcula-
tion of emissions from power plants.95 Carter Administration regulations re-
quired each smokestack at a given plant to meet Clean Air Act emissions re-
quirements.96 The Reagan Administration instead proposed to treat multiple
smokestacks at a plant under one "bubble,"97 thus allowing new, efficient
smokestacks to offset the emissions of older, less-efficient smokestacks.98 The
Reagan rule permitted more aggregate pollution than the Carter rule. Envi-
ronmentalists thus sued, arguing that the Clean Air Act forbade the bubble
rule.
91. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-500, 86 Star. 816.
92. See Maxwell L. Steams, Stand&ig at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 934-35 (2008) ("Mhe Rehnquist Court's conservatism was targeted against a
different liberal philosophy than New Deal progressivism. Instead, it was aimed at retrenching the Warren
Court's liberal rights-driven jurisprudence.").
93. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (GorsuchJ., concurring).
94. Id. at 1152.






The Act defined "stationary source" as "any building, structure, facility, or
installation" which emits air pollution.99 The Court found this language sus-
ceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations00 Under existing law, the
meaning of the Clean Air Act could have been decided by the Court de no-
vo. 10 1 The Court instead took a different tack,10 2 holding that the agency
charged with implementing a statute should resolve any ambiguities, and a
reasonable resolution should receive judicial deference.0 3 The Court's role,
once ambiguity is found, is solely to guard against unreasonable interpreta-
tions.104
Chevron initially imposed a two-step test: first, is there a statutory ambigui-
ty, or has Congress spoken directly to the question at issue? If it is the latter,
there is no room for agency discretion, and the inquiry concludes. But if the
statute is ambiguous, the court proceeds to Step Two: has the agency adopted
a reasonable interpretation? If so, the court must defer to it.
Later cases added what has come to be known as Chevron Step Zero
(which, as the numbering applies, occurs before Step One): did Congress em-
power the agency to take on the interpretive role?05 Step Zero results in less
deference, because courts may conclude at Step Zero that Congress did not
endow the agency with interpretive authority, even when the statute is ambig-
uous. 106 If the agency loses at Step Zero, the Court does not apply Chevron
deference but instead uses Skidmore/Mead eference'0 7 or interprets the statute
de novo.
The Court has also limited the circumstances in which Chevron applies in
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012); see Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
100. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-60.
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Moderm'ze Stare Decirsfor
theAdministraive State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.15 (2017).
102. Cbevron has been called revolutionary. E.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Ad-
ministrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judiaal Power over Statutoy Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1239, 1259 n.78 (2002); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminay in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1062 (1995); Kenneth W. Starr, Jucial Review
in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986). But see William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E.
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Ageny Statutog Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1120-21 (2008) ('Although the 'revolutionary' nature of Chevron seems ac-
cepted by lawyers, lower court judges, and academics, at the level of Supreme Court practice, and even
doctrine, Chevron's status strikes us as something short of that"); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Doerence to Adminis-
trative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512 ('It should not be thought that the Chevron doctrine-
except in the clarity and the seemingly categorical nature of its expression-is entirely new law.').
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
104. Id. at 866.
105. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
106. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has MuddledJudicial Review ofAgengAction, 58 VAND. L REV.
1443, 1464 (2005); see, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp., 374 F.3d 362, 369
(5th Cir. 2004).
107. The Court has stated that, under Skidmore, deference is due to the extent that the agency inter-
pretation has the power to persuade. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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other ways. In Kang v. Burwell, for example, the Court declined to interpret
statutory ambiguity as an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the
agency, holding that when a major rule is at issue, Congress should confer
power on the agency explicitly.108 As the Court put it, the statutory ambiguity
in the Affordable Care Act raised a "question of deep economic and political
significance that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.'10 9
1. Scalia's Approach to Chevron
When Scalia joined the Court, he endorsed the Chevron two-step:
[Chevron] was in accord with the origins of federal-court judicial review. Ju-
dicial control of federal executive officers was principally exercised
through the prerogative writ of mandamus. That writ generally would not
issue unless the executive officer was acting plainly beyond the scope of
his authority.... Statutory ambiguities, in other words, were left to reason-
able resolution by the Executive.110
At that point in his career, Scalia suggested that courts should resolve no am-
biguities at Step One-not even by using "traditional tools of statutory con-
struction"-but should instead apply Chevron deference "full force.""' "If
Chevron is to have any meaning,... congressional intent must be regarded as
'ambiguous' not just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any
other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally
valid, interpretations exist."
1 12
Justice Scalia's textualism would lead him, however, to resolve any num-
ber of Chevron issues without deferring to the agency interpretation. Scalia
himself acknowledged that his strict textualism would lead him to find statutes
clear at Step One, "thereby find[mg] less often ... the triggering requirement
for Chevron deference."113 And, indeed, this was the case: an empirical exami-
nation of Chevron decisions from 1989 to 2006 found that "Justice Scalia, the
108. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
109. Id
110. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 241-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
111. Scalia, supra note 102, at 512 & n.6 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
Justice Scalia cites his own concurrence in CardoZa-Fonseca, where he argued: "The Court... implies that
courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever, '[e]mploying tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction,' they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of
the statute. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer
only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but
an evisceration of Chevron." Cardora-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
112. Scalia, supra note 102, at 520.
113. Id at 521.
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Court's most vocal Chevron enthusiast, is the least deferential.' 114 Justice Scalia
was thus regularly criticized for not giving agencies sufficient freedom of deci-
sion under Chevron."
5
Nonetheless, Scalia's support for the idea of Chevron was strong, even
when it seemed to run against his originalist commitments. He noted, for ex-
ample, the apparent inconsistency of Chevron with Marbupy if "[ilt is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is,"11 6 then it is "seemingly, a striking abdication of judicial responsibility" to
give "binding" deference to agency interpretations."7 But, Scalia wrote, courts
had long accepted executive interpretations of law on a case-by-case basis,
discerning whether Congress had intended the courts to defer to executive
interpretations. Chevron's genius, for Scalia, was to apply "an across-the-board
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, [Congress intended] agency discre-
tion."118
Accordingly, Justice Scalia despised Chevron Step Zero, which he viewed
as arrogating too much power to the Judicial Branch at the expense of the
Legislative and Executive Branches. For Justice Scalia, the very fact that Con-
gress had written an ambiguous statute was enough: that meant the agency
was the one to resolve the ambiguity (as long as it did so reasonably). Meads
creation of Step Zero had "largely replaced Chevron... with that test most
beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants
who want to know what to expect): th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances'
test."119
Near the end of his time on the Court, Justice Scalia hinted at disen-
chantment with some of Chevron's progeny.120 But he continued to believe that
"the rule of Chevron, if it did not comport with the [Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)], at least was in conformity with the long history of judicial review
of executive action, where '[s]tatutory ambiguities ... were left to reasonable
resolution by the Executive."
' 2'
114. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Pofiy? An Empirical nvesfigaion of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (2006) (footnote omitted).
115. Gregory E. Maggs, Reconcifing Texatual'sm and the Chevron Dodtrine: In Defense of Justice Scaia, 28
CoNN. L. REV. 393, 404-06 & nn.69-87 (1996) (collecting sources critical ofJustice Scalia's use of Chevron).
116. Scalia, supra note 102, at 513 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
117. Id. at 513-14.
118. Id.at516.
119. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. E.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211-12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that Auer had led to "a balance between power and procedure quite different from
the one Congress chose when it enacted the APA" and suggesting that Chevron might need to be "uproot-
ed[] with respect to interpretive rules setting forth agency interpretation of statutes"); see infra notes 140-41,
147-55, 189 and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 1212 (alterations in original) (quoting Mead Cotp., 533 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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2. Gorsuch's Approach to Chevron
Justice Gorsuch differs dramatically from Justice Scalia on Chevron defer-
ence. While on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch wrote a lengthy con-
currence in a case called GulierreZ-Brizuela that lays out his position quite clear-
ly: "[T]he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate
federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with
the Constitution of the framers' design."'
1 22
First, then-Judge Gorsuch adopted the Marbugy-focused position that
judges, not agencies, should authoritatively interpret law.123 He expressly
adopts the view that Justice Scalia had rejected decades earlier: "Chevron seems
no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty."'1 24
"[W]hatever the agency may be doing under Chevron, the problem remains that
courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret the law and declare invalid
agency actions inconsistent with those interpretations in the cases and contro-
versies that come before them."'12 And, he argues, this abdication has serious
separation-of-powers consequences because "[t]ransferring the job of saying
what the law is from the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the
very sort of due process (fair notice) and equal protection concerns the fram-
ers knew would arise if the political branches intruded on judicial func-
tions."1
26
Second, Judge Gorsuch noted that the APA, which governs the agency
rulemaking process, places the responsibility of interpreting statutory provi-
sions, and the power to overturn regulations inconsistent with those interpre-
tations, with the court.127 Chevron is at odds with that mandate. In Gorsuch's
view, the APA's assignment of responsibility to courts rather than to agencies
is not just a legislative choice, but may be constitutionally compelled to main-
tain the separation of powers.128 And, indeed, he describes Chevron as a threat
to the constitutional structure:
After all, Chevron invests the power to decide the meaning of the law, and
to do so with legislative policy goals in mind, in the very entity charged
with enforcing the law. Under its terms, an administrative agency may set
122. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (GorsuchJ., concurring).
123. Id. at 1151.
124. Id. at 1152.
125. Id at 1152-53 (emphasis omitted).
126. Id. at 1152.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). Justice Scalia acknowledged that Chevron had overlooked the APA but
found that mistake forgivable. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-42 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the [APA], which it did not
even bother to cite. But it was in accord with the origins of federal-court judicial review." (footnote omit-
ted)).
128. GufierreZ-BriZuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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and revise policy (legislative), override adverse judicial determinations (u-
dicial), and exercise enforcement discretion (executive). Add to this the
fact that today many administrative agencies "wield[] vast power" and are
overseen by political appointees (but often receive little effective oversight
from the chief executive to whom they nominally report), and you have a
pretty potent mix. Under any conception of our separation of powers, I
would have thought powerful and centralized authorities like today's ad-
ministrative agencies would have warranted less deference from other
branches, not more.
129
In another Tenth Circuit case, he said that "one might question whether Chev-
ron step two muddles the separation of powers by delegating to the Executive
the power to legislate generally applicable rules of private conduct.'
130
Then-Judge Gorsuch recognized that, as an intermediate appellate court
judge, he was bound by Chevron, but now-Justice Gorsuch is constrained only
by stare decisis.131 He has however thus far found no vehicle for executing his
anti-Chevron mission since he joined the Court in April 2017 (though in De-
cember 2018 the Court granted certiorari in a case challenging Auer defer-
ence132). So far he has discussed Chevron most expansively in a recent state-
ment regarding the denial of certiorari, which invited petitions in later cases
that might be more suitable to his mission.133 Notably, Justice Gorsuch did not
join Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions, where Justice Kennedy
criticized lower courts' use of Chevron deference in immigration cases.
134
B. Auer
In 1997, the Court established an even stronger category of deference to
agency interpretations, with Justice Scalia writing the opinion for a unanimous
Court.135 Auer v. Robbins held that agencies were due strong deference in their
interpretations of their own regulations: such interpretations were "controlling
unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."' 136 Justice Scalia
made clear that "the Secretary ... is free to write the regulations as broadly as
129. Id. at 1155 (citation and footnote omitted).
130. De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).
131. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) ("[Ihe rule of stare decisis
is not an 'inexorable command ...."D.
132. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari as to question
one).
133. See Scenic Am. Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 138 S. Ct. 2, 2-3 (2017) (statement of Gorsuch, J.,
joined by Roberts, C.J. and Alito, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). Scenic America actually provided a
strikingly unsuitable case for the question, and I have elsewhere described Justice Gorsuch's use of the case
as tendentious and misleading. See Elliott, supra note 23.
134. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120-21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
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he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute."'1 37
This permitted a particular kind of strategic action by agencies. An agency
faces a fairly onerous procedural path when promulgating notice-and-
comment regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act.138 But, the
APA imposes no such requirements on interpretative rules.139 And Auer says
that such interpretive rules receive controlling deference. Thus, given Auer, an
agency has the incentive to write a vague, relatively uncontroversial notice-
and-comment rule, deal with the innocuous comments that it receives, and
then do all the controversial work in the interpretations (which do not have to
go through notice and comment and will nevertheless receive strong defer-
ence from the Court).
Justice Scalia later came to reject Auer for these incentives to strategic be-
havior on the part of agencies. "To expand [its notice-and-comment-free]
domain, the agency need only write substantive rules more broadly and vague-
ly, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later, using interpretive rules un-
checked by notice and comment."'140 He thus argued-without acknowledging
that he had written Auer in the first place-that it was rotten and needed to be
overruled: "Where are weighty reasons to deny a lawgiver the power to write
ambiguous laws and then be the judge of what the ambiguity means."'141
As a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Neil Gorsuch did not say much about
Auer, though he did describe the deference it required as "obeisance."'' 42 Since
joining the Court, however, Justice Gorsuch has joined in a dissent from deni-
137. Id at 463.
138. In part because courts recognize the expertise of agencies in the subject matter of their work,
courts instead check agency action through procedural requirements. E.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly
Signah'g Theory of '-IardLook"JudialReiew, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 753, 758 (2006). When conducting "notice-
and-comment rulemaking," an agency must produce a draft regulation, publish it in the Federal Register,
receive public comments, and then issue the final rule with an explanation of how all of the comments were
addressed. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Any choice that is not cogently explained will likely be reversed. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56-57 (1983). Likewise,
courts will reverse when the agency fails to address significant arguments made in the comments, see United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977), and when the agency does
not make public the underlying data used in drafting the rule, see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
S.E.C., 443 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006). And if the final rule departs significantly from the draft rule, the
agency will likely be required to conduct a new round of notice and comment. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n of
the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1985). All of these requirements come from judicial
glosses on the simple language of 5 U.S.C. § 553.
139. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
140. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
141. Id at 1212-13 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1213 ("I would therefore restore the balance
originally struck by the APA with respect to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, not by rewrit-
ing the Act in order to make up for Auer, but by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as written. The
agency is free to interpret its own regulations with or without notice and comment; but courts will decide-
with no deference to the agency-whether that interpretation is correct.'".
142. ElEncanto, Inc. v. Hatch Chile Co., Inc., 825 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2016).
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al of certiorari in a case that would have allowed the overruling of Auer.1
43 In
that dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:
[Auerj deference is constitutionally suspect. It transfers "the judge's exer-
cise of interpretive judgment to the agency," which is "not properly consti-
tuted to exercise the judicial power." It also undermines "the judicial
'check' on the political branches" by ceding the courts' authority to inde-
pendently interpret and apply legal texts. And it results in an "accumula-
tion of governmental powers" by allowing the same agency that promul-
gated a regulation to "change the meaning" of that regulation "at [its]
discretion." This Court has never "put forward a persuasive justification"
for [Aued] deference.
.... Even the author of Auer came to doubt its correctness.144
And, certainly, if then-Judge Gorsuch thought that Chevron "[t]ransferr[ed]
the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to the executive[,] . . .
invit[ing] the very sort of due process . . . and equal protection concerns the
framers knew would arise if the political branches intruded on judicial func-
tions,"'145 Justice Gorsuch would presumably feel the same about Auer. We
should discover his views on Auer when the Court decides K'sor v. Wilkie, a
case in which the Court just granted certiorari that asks whether Auer should
be overturned.146
C. City of Arlington
Justice Scalia confirmed the breadth of deference to agency interpreta-
tions in City of Arlington.147 There, the statutory provision at issue affected the
scope of the agency's authority. If the statute was interpreted one way, then
the agency had power over the decision; if it was interpreted another way,
then the agency lacked power. The question was whether Chevron deference
applied to the agency's interpretation, or whether the jurisdictional nature of
the question counseled against deference.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that Chevron deference ap-
plied. Unlike courts, for whom important differences exist between "jurisdic-
tional" and "merits" questions, Justice Scalia wrote, agencies' "power to act
and how they are to act are authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that
when they act improperly, no less than when they act beyond their jurisdic-
143. Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052, 1052 (2018) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
144. Id at 1052-53 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
145. Guierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
146. Kisor v. Wilie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari as to question
one).
147. See general# City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) (Scalia, writing for the court, held that
courts must, when there is ambiguity, defer to an agency interpretation of its own authority).
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tion, what they do is ultra vires."'1 48 He called the "distinction between 'juris-
dictional' and 'nonjurisdictional' interpretations... a mirage,"'149 resting on the
false premise that "[s]ome interpretations-the big, important ones, presuma-
bly--define the agency's 'jurisdiction.' Others-humdrum, run-of-the-mill
stuff-are simply applications of jurisdiction the agency plainly has."150 The
majority rejected that distinction, however: "[n]o matter how it is framed, the
question a court faces when confronted with an agency's interpretation of a
statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agengy has stayed within the
bounds of its statutory authoriqy."'1'
As ample precedent demonstrates, Justice Scalia wrote, the Court has al-
ways recognized that Chevron applies to all of these questions,152 even "where
concerns about agency self-aggrandizement are at their apogee: in cases where
an agency's expansive construction of the extent of its own power would have
wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.' 153 And Justice Scal-
ia believed that much more was at stake if the Court took the opposite view:
"[t]he false dichotomy between 'jurisdictional' and 'nonjurisdictional' agency
interpretations may be no more than a bogeyman, but it is dangerous all the
same.... Make no mistake-the ultimate target here is Chevron itself."154 The
result of adopting the dissent's approach, he wrote, "would be to transfer any
number of interpretive decisions-archetypal Chevron questions, about how
best to construe an ambiguous term in light of competing policy interests-
from the agencies that administer the statutes to federal courts."'155
Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito) dissented:
courts must "ensur[e] that the Legislative Branch has in fact delegated law-
making power to an agency within the Executive Branch, before the Judiciary
defers to the Executive on what the law is."'156 After all, the whole point of
deference is to implement Congress's decision to delegate power to administra-
tive agencies. If a court doesn't first determine what Congress's intent was-
i.e., what range of authority Congress thought it was giving the agency-then
deferring to the agency may in fact depart from what Congress intended.
Moreover, Roberts argued,
That concern is heightened, not diminished, by the fact that the adminis-
trative agencies, as a practical matter, draw upon a potent brew of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial power. And it is heightened, not diminished,




152. Id. at 301-03.
153. Id. at 303.
154. Id. at 304.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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by the dramatic shift in power over the last 50 years from Congress to the
Executive-a shift effected through the administrative agencies.
157
Here, Chief Justice Roberts echoes Justice Gorsuch's concerns expressed
above about the "titanic administrative state."
15 8 Then-Judge Gorsuch cited
the Roberts dissent approvingly in his Gutlierez-Brizuela concurrence, believing
that the Roberts opinion stood for the principle that Chevron and its progeny
"appear[] . . . to qualify as a violation of the separation of powers."' 59 He goes
on to say: "[l]f an agency can interpret the scope of its statutory jurisdiction
one way one day and reverse itself the next (and that is exactly what Ciy of
Arlington's application of Chevron says it can), you might well wonder: where
are the promised 'clearly delineated boundaries' of agency authority?"
60 One
might expect, then, that now-Justice Gorsuch would be happy to overrule City
ofArlington.
D. Whitman
Administrative agencies raise constitutional questions, because they ap-
pear to make law (exercising legislative power), as well as enforcing that law
(executive power) and adjudicating disputes under that law (judicial power).
161
Concerns about the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies
came to a head in the mid-1930s, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New
Deal sought to implement federal regulation of the economy on a scale never
seen before in the United States.
162
The Supreme Court initially rejected key New Deal legislation, some on
the ground that it exceeded Congress's authority to permit administrative
agencies to take action that looked like legislation. In Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, the Court struck down a provision of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA) as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority.
63 And in
A.LA. Schechter Poulty Corp. v. United States, the Court struck down the heart
of the NIRA, finding that it gave essentially standardless authority to the Ex-
ecutive Branch to regulate the economy.64 As Justice Cardozo wrote in his
157. Id.
158. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). See
supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text.
159. Gutierrez-Bri.uela, 834 F.3d at 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 1154-55 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989)).
161. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text; see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administraive State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231-54 (1994).
162. E.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1248
(1986) (claiming that New Deal programs reveal "a belief that comprehensive government intervention was
not only a useful corrective but an essential ingredient for maintaining a general state of equilibrium in the
economy").
163. 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935).
164. 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935).
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concurrence, "[t]his is delegation running riot. No such plenitude of power is
susceptible of transfer.'165 And indeed he did not overstate: NIRA not only
delegated broad powers to the Executive Branch, but it also delegated authori-
ty to private industry trade groups to develop codes of fair competition for
the President to approve.
166
Schechter's nondelegation doctrine was essentially moribund within a cou-
ple of years,167 as the Court issued the opinions that would establish the broad
Commerce Clause power that characterizes modern federal legislation.
168 In
the succeeding decades, the Court upheld statute after statute that gave agen-
cies broad authority to regulate, so long as it could discern an "intelligible
principle" laid down by Congress to constrain agency discretion.169 An effort
to revive the nondelegation doctrine in the late twentieth century was rejected
by a unanimous Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.170 Jus-
tice Scalia wrote for the Court:
In the history of the Court we have found the requisite "intelligible princi-
ple" lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guid-
ance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred au-
thority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a
standard than stimulating the economy by assuring "fair competition." We
have, on the other hand,... found an "intelligible principle" in various
statutes authorizing regulation in the "public interest." In short, we have
"almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the per-
missible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law.'
171
165. Id. at 553.
166. See Rabin, supra note 162, at 1243-44 ("Section 3 of the NIRA granted authority to the Presi-
dent to approve 'codes of fair competition' submitted by industry trade groups. The codes were to be
promulgated by industry groups that were 'truly representative' and were not to 'promote monopolies.' But
beyond these cautionary terms, the statute contained virtually no limiting language.... [T]he Act left the
content of the codes purposely vague.... With so little substantive constraint, the codes could address a
vast range of business practices, including price levels, wage and hour provisions, price discrimination,
advertising practices, and output restrictions." (footnote omitted)).
167. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Adminis-
tralive State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1401 (2000) (pointing out that, after Schecbter, "[t]he Court never again
expressly applied the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a statute'". Of course, Congress has never again
tried to delegate the authority to regulate the economy to private industry trade groups; presumably that
would not fly even in the modem administrative state. See Rabin, supra note 162, at 1257 ("Sebecbter arguably
retains its authority as a statement of the outer limits of federal regulatory power. Even today, a congres-
sional act which set up a business regulatory commission with plenary power to establish 'fair competitive
practices' enumerated by industry trade groups would be of doubtful validity. In Schechter, the nondelegation
doctrine found its home as a residual check on wholesale amalgamation of public and private spheres of
activity.").
168. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 548 (1937); NLRB v. Jones-Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 1
(1937).
169. Bressman, supra note 167, at 1404-05.
170. 531 U.S. 457, 476 (2001).
171. Id. at 474-75 (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in rejecting the D.C. Circuit's
effort to revive Shechter and Panama Refining. And his opinion on the matter
had been clear from his confirmation hearing for the Supreme Court: "it is
very difficult for the courts to say how much delegation is too much. It is a
very, very difficult question, and I think it expressed the view that, in most
cases, the courts are just going to have to leave that constitutional issue to be
resolved by the Congress."'
72
Justice Gorsuch would apparently take a different approach. In his Gut-
tiereZ-BriZuela concurrence, he revealed a largely nineteenth century perspective
on the administrative state. He indicated that, in his view, Congress can em-
power agencies to do the following- "Congress may condition the application
of a new rule of general applicability on factual findings to be made by the
executive (so, for example, forfeiture of assets might be required if the execu-
tive finds a foreign country behaved in a specified manner),"1 73 and "Congress
may allow the executive to resolve 'details' (like, say, the design of an appro-
priate tax stamp)."'1 74 This view, based on cases from 1813 and 1897, would
rule out almost all regulatory agencies and their organic acts.175 Making factual
findings and designing tax stamps are a far cry from regulating "in the public
interest," as many twentieth century statutes authorize,176 or setting national
ambient air quality standards at a level "requisite to protect the public
health."1
77
Indeed, Judge Gorsuch seems to be staking out a pre-New Deal view of
the delegation of legislative power. Elsewhere he refers to "so-called 'delegat-
ed' legislative authority."'1 78 In GutfiereZ-Brizuela, he cites Scbecbter179 and states,
"Some thoughtful judges and scholars have questioned whether standards like
[the intelligible principle doctrine] serve as... a license for [the improper del-
egation of legislative authority], undermining the separation between the legis-
172. Nomination of Judge Antonin Sca&a, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on theJudiaty, 99th Cong. 36 (1986) (statement of Judge Antonin Scalia).
173. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cit. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(citing Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813)).
174. Id. (citing In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1897)).
175. Though the Interstate Commerce Commission (described as the first modem federal regulatory
agency, see general4 Cass R Sunstein, Constitutionaksm After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987)) was
created in 1887, and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the bulk of federal regulatory statutes were enacted
in the twentieth century. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (1973).
176. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-25 (1943) (upholding Federal
Communications Commission's power to regulate airwaves to serve the "public interest, convenience or
necessity"); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (upholding Interstate Com-
merce Commission's power to approve railroad consolidations if in the "public interest").
177. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (upholding Clean Air Act's
delegation of authority to EPA to set national ambient air quality standards).
178. Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 969 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Chevron
U.SA. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)).
179. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935).
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lative and executive powers that the founders thought essential."'180 To be
sure, Gorsuch's argument is against Chevron and its progeny, not for a reestab-
lishment of the nondelegation doctrine. 181 But his argument does carry the
seeds of a broader argument against the administrative state. Here is how he
put it while on the Tenth Circuit:
[C]an Congress really delegate its legislative authority-its power to write
new rules of general applicability-to executive agencies? The Supreme
Court has long recognized that under the Constitution "congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the president" and that this "principle [is] uni-
versally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system
of government ordained by the constitution." Yet on this account of Chev-
ron we're examining, its whole point and purpose seems to be exactly
that-to delegate legislative power to the executive branch.
82
E. Brand X
Brand X 83 incurred Justice Scalia's ire from the start, and Justice Gorsuch
shares that ire. The question presented in the case arose from a timing prob-
lem that can arise under Chevron.
Remember that, under Chevron Step Two, a court is to defer to an agency's
reasonable resolution of statutory ambiguity. But what about statutory ambi-
guities that an agency has not yet resolved? In order to resolve a case involv-
ing that statute, the court must do its best to interpret the ambiguous provi-
sion. Does that interpretation then constrain the agency? After all, an agency's
reasonable interpretation would ordinarily govern under Chevron. Should the
accident of timing govern who gets to interpret the statute?
The Supreme Court in Brand X said that timing should not be disposi-
tive.184 If the earlier court opinion made clear that the statute was ambiguous,
then Chevron leaves the agency free to choose among permissible interpreta-
tions. The court's interpretation must give way to the agency's later decision
to choose a different interpretation. Otherwise, "allowing a judicial precedent
to foreclose an agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute, as the Court of
Appeals assumed it could, would allow a court's interpretation to override an
agency's."1
85
This approach does not violate separation of powers or stare decisis, the
Court held, because it recognizes Congresss decision to leave the resolution of
180. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (GorsuchJ., concurring).
181. Id at 1158 ('We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could do it
again.'.
182. Id. at 1153-54 (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)) (citation and
emphasis omitted).
183. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
184. Id. at 982.
185. Id
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ambiguities with the agency. "[W]hether Congress has delegated to an agency
the authority to interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the
judicial and administrative constructions occur."18 6 Because Congress has
made the agency the authoritative interpreter of the statute, the court decision
"has not been 'reversed' by the agency, any more than a federal court's inter-
pretation of a State's law can be said to have been 'reversed' by a state court
that adopts a conflicting (yet authoritative) interpretation of state law."'
1 87 If
the earlier court decision held the statute unambiguous, however, the agency
has no ambiguities to interpret, and the earlier court decision is binding. 88
Justice Scalia was having none of it. He accused the Court of "inventing
yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial decisions subject to reversal by ex-
ecutive officers.... This is not only bizarre. It is probably unconstitution-
al .... Article III courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or
ignored by executive officers."'
189
Justice Gorsuch agrees. He wrote while on the Tenth Circuit:
Brand X still risks trampling the constitutional design by affording execu-
tive agencies license to overrule a judicial declaration of the law's meaning
prospectively, just as legislation might-and all without the inconvenience
of having to engage the legislative processes the Constitution prescribes. A
form of Lawmaking Made Easy, one that permits all too easy intrusions on
the liberty of the people.'
90
Thus one might expect Justice Gorsuch to welcome the opportunity to over-
rule Brand X
As demonstrated in this Part, Justice Scalia and Justice Gorsuch differ
markedly in their views of the administrative state. One might have expected
them to agree on more; indeed, Justice Scalia's administrative law decision-
making is not what one would have expected from the famous originalist. But
Justice Scalia described himself in 1989 as a faint-hearted originalist: one for
whom stare decisis could trump originalist commitments.'91 Justice Gorsuch
has said, "Originalism has regained its place at the table with the Constitu-
tion[al] interpretation and textualism in the reading of statutes ... and neither
one is going anywhere on my watch."'
192
186. Id. at 983.
187. Id. at 983-84.
188. Id at 984.
189. Id. at 1016-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
191. See general# Antonin Scalia, Oiginalism: The LesserEvil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
192. Rachel del Guidice, Gorsuch Touts Originalism, Textualism in Address to Conservative Legal Sodey,
DAILY SIGNAL (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/11/17/gorsuch-touts-oiginalism-text
ualism-in-address-to-conservative-legal-society/.
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III. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGES TO THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
In concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions, one of his last opinions on the Court,
Justice Anthony Kennedy stated that he was troubled by the amount of defer-
ence given to some agency decisions: "The proper rules for interpreting stat-
utes and determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers
should accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the
function and province of the Judiciary."'193 He cited evidence that Justices
Thomas, Roberts, and Gorsuch may be ready to roll back at least some forms
of Chevron deference.1 94 On Kennedy's view, then, only one more vote was
needed to work significant change in administrative law doctrine.
Justice Kennedy was correct to cite Justice Gorsuch as an ally in this fight,
as I have argued above. Even though he did not join Justice Kennedy's con-
currence in Pereira,195 Justice Gorsuch has already taken other steps in con-
formity with his Tenth-Circuit anti-Chevron agenda. He has written a statement
on denial of certiorari, suggesting that Skidmore deference was inappropriate
for agency litigation positions.1 96 He joined in a dissent from denial of certio-
rari in a case that would have allowed the overruling of Auer.197And he wrote a
statement on denial of certiorari in Scenic America, which sought to ask wheth-
er Chevron deference was due to agency contract interpretations.198
Justice Thomas is also a reliable vote against Chevron, Auer, and the others.
He agrees with Justice Gorsuch that Chevron, Auer, and the others raise poten-
tial constitutional problems.199 And, indeed, he would go further to limit the
193. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Id; see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312-28 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Michigan
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149-58
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
195. This is presumably because Justice Gorsuch agreed with the majority that the Chevron question
was not presented, given the clarity of the statute. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2114 ("The statutory text alone is
enough to resolve this case.'). See also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) ("No party to
these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron deference."); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358
(2018) (declining an invitation to ovemale Chevron because the clarity of the statute prevented the question
of deference from arising).
196. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Smiley, 138 S. Ct. 2563 (2018) (statement of Gorsuch,
J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (addressing whether agencies
should receive Skidmore deference for litigation positions).
197. Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052, 1052 (2018) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
198. Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 138 S. Ct. 2 (2017) (statement of Gorsuch, J., joined
by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); as I have argued elsewhere, Justice Gor-
such uses the case as a springboard for his anti-Chevron views, even though the case has little to do with
Chevron. See Elliott, supra note 23.
199. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 2714
("[W]e seem to be straying further and further from the Constitution without so much as pausing to ask
why. We should stop to consider that document before blithely giving the force of law to any other agency
'interpretations' of federal statutes.').
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authority that Congress can confer on administrative agencies.200
Justice Kennedy did not cite Justice Alito as a potential vote to address
problems with Chevron and its progeny, presumably because Justice Alito dis-
sented in Pereira. He would have found the statute ambiguous and Chevron ap-
plicable: "[J]nless the Court has overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has
somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law."
'201 However, Justice
Alito has expressed concern about some of the administrative deference doc-
trines. In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, for example, Justice Alito wrote an
opinion for the Court that echoed Justice Scalia's worries about Auer.
202 "Our
practice of deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regu-
lations undoubtedly has important advantages, but this practice also creates a
risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they
can later interpret as they see fit, thereby 'frustrat[ing] the notice and predicta-
bility purposes of rulemaking."'
203
Justice Kennedy has now been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh. He has not
yet taken any actions on the Court to suggest one way or the other how he
might vote204 (and, while on the D.C. Circuit, he was not as outspoken as
then-Judge Gorsuch20 . Commentators, however, have suggested that Ka-
vanaugh is likely to vote to change the deference doctrines.
20 6
That makes Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh all possible
votes to alter at least some of the deference doctrines. Only one more Justice
would be needed to work significant change in administrative law. Does Chief
Justice Roberts still count as a reliable vote to change Chevron doctrines, as
Justice Kennedy believed?
Roberts certainly has rejected some of Chevron's progeny, most notably
dissenting in City of Arlington.207 He has also limited Chevron's application,
200. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I
am not convinced that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. I
believe that there are cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated
decision is simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than legislative.' . .. On a future
day,... I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far
from our Founders' understanding of separation of powers.").
201. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2129 (Alito,J., dissenting).
202. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012).
203. Id at 158 (alternation in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
204. As of February 27, 2019, Justice Kavanaugh had authored only one opinion of any kind, an
opinion for a unanimous Court on an arbitrability issue. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019).
205. Compare general# Kent Barnett, Christina L Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh,
Chevron Dference, and the Supreme Court, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (Sep. 3, 2018), www.theregreview.org/
2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaugh-chevron-deference-supreme-court/, with supra Section lI.A.2.
206. E.g., Barnett et al., supra note 205 (citing Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, 129 HARV. L REV. 2118 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
(2014))).
207. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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developing the "major questions" doctrine in Ing v. Burwell.208 And, as noted
immediately above, he has joined in some of the dissents from denial of certi-
orari and statements upon denial of certiorari that involve Auer, Skidmore, and
some applications of Chevron.
At the same time, Chief Justice Roberts seems alive to the downsides of
major doctrinal shifts in the wake of President Trump's controversial ap-
pointments to the Court. Even before Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court,
Linda Greenhouse noted the "superheated language" that Justice Gorsuch
used in a dissent209 and the Chief Justice's reaction to it, stating that "[m]y
sense is that the Chief Justice reads this heavily freighted political moment as a
time to avoid spending the Supreme Court's limited capital needlessly, in con-
trast to his junior colleague's evident desire to make as much noise as he
Can."
210
The Chief has also taken other steps perceived as trying to maintain the
institutional legitimacy of the Court, given President Trump's attacks on the
rule of law. So, for example, when Trump tweeted about "Obama judges,"
Chief Justice Roberts issued a statement hrough the Supreme Court's public-
information office, stating that, as quoted by the Washington Post, '[the fed-
eral judiciary] do[es] not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or
Clinton judges.' . . . 'What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated
judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appearing before
them.' 211 Similarly, the Chief Justice spoke in October to reinforce the
Court's independence from the political branches, apparently prompted by the
contentious Kavanaugh confirmation process.212
Changes in administrative deference doctrines, however, may not cause
the kind of political turmoil that changes in marriage equality and abortion law
would cause. Indeed, it is possible that a challenge to a Trump Administration
action would present the perfect opportunity for Chief Justice Roberts to alter
Chevron or related doctrines while simultaneously ensuring that the Court does
not look like it is rubber-stamping Trump policies. Many of the Trump Ad-
ministration's efforts to roll back Obama-era policies involve adopting differ-
ent internal interpretations of regulations, implicating Auer deference,213 or
208. 135 S. Ct 2480 (2015).
209. Linda Greenhouse, The ChiefJustice, Searching for Middle Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/opinion/chief-justice-roberts-middle.html (citing Artis v. District
of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 617 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("[W]e've wandered so far from the idea
of a federal government of limited and enumerated powers that we've begun to lose sight of what it looked
like in the first place.")).
210. Id.
211. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump's Critidsm of 'Obama Judge,' Chief Justice Roberts Defends Judiday as
5Indetpendent,'WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018) (statement of Chief Justice Roberts).
212. Robert Barnes, Roberts Assures Auience Smpreme Court Will Serve 'One Nation,' Not One Patty or
Interest, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2018).
213. E.g., Carlos Romo, A Yearfor the Birds: ESA Developments and a New Interpretation of the MBTA in
2017, 49 ABA TRENDS, no. 4, Mar.-Apr. 2018, at 9 (noting that the Department of the Interior had used
2019]
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promulgating rules that take different interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language, implicating Chevron deference.21
4 Were the Court to reject the Trump
interpretations by altering Chevron or Auer, the Court could eat its cake and
have it, too.
CONCLUSION
Trying to predict outcomes in the Supreme Court is, of course, difficult
and perhaps foolhardy. What is certain is that the Court has now granted re-
view in Kisor v. Wilkide, which asks whether Auer should be overruled.
215 That
case should give us a good sense of the direction the Court is heading-and
what role Justice Gorsuch will play in taking it there.
internal guidance documents to change the interpretation of when a bird is "taken" under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act).
214. EPA is currently receiving comments on a rule proposed to replace the Obama Administra-
tion's Waters of the United States policy under the Clean Water Act. See EPA, Waters of the United States
(WOTUS) Rulemaking, https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
215. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari as to question
one).
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